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INTRODUCTION
In 2004, the National Science Advisory
Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) was cre-
ated as an independent federal advisory
body. Its role was to advise the U.S. govern-
ment on strategies to prevent the misuse
of dual-use research. Since its inception,
the NSABB has ruled on two cases: the
1918 flu-virus synthesis conducted by gov-
ernment scientists in 2005 and the H5N1
experiment conducted in 2011 by two
separate university teams in the Nether-
lands and the United States. While in the
first case, without much public debate, the
NSABB quickly decided to support publi-
cation of the experiment’s findings, in the
second case, it initially requested a halt on
publication and the removal of method-
ological details from the proposed arti-
cles for fear that they could be used by
malevolent actors to create a pandemic
among humans. The decision was reversed
6 months later, but it sparked a worldwide
firestorm, engaging the scientific and secu-
rity communities in a heated debate about
whether the dissemination of scientific data
should be regulated, and what types of
research should be conducted. Yet, the key
question that triggered the overall contro-
versy remains largely ignored: under what
conditions could the H5N1 experiment be
reproduced, if at all, by malevolent actors
using only published data?
The lack of attention to the issue of
reproducibility stems from a widespread
belief that science is inherently repro-
ducible and published data are the primary
tool allowing such replication. Empirical
evidence suggests otherwise. Analysis of
recent dual-use research projects and past
bioweapons programs shows that repro-
ducibility of past work faces stiff chal-
lenges, especially when using written pro-
tocols alone. Translating a scientific idea
into a product that functions reliably is
a challenge that is routinely encountered
in the pharmaceutical industry, as well
as in past bioweapons programs. In this
article, we start by emphasizing the chal-
lenges associated with reproducing sci-
entific experiments and their application
to specific purposes based on empirical
research conducted by the authors. We
then suggest criteria to weigh security
risks against the health benefits of dual-
use research for the purpose of producing
more accurate threat assessments, without
imposing unnecessary restrictions on the
diffusion of knowledge.
SOURCES OF REPRODUCIBILITY
CHALLENGES IN SCIENCE
While the H5N1 controversy was raging,
the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
revealed that much of its past funded
research could not be reproduced. In 2012,
for example, the drug company Amgen
reported that it failed to reproduce 89% of
the findings from 53 major cancer-related
papers (1). The previous year, the phar-
maceutical company Bayer in Germany
indicated that it could not validate the
results of two-thirds of its own preclin-
ical studies (1). Interestingly, no connec-
tions were made between these revelations
and the H5N1 experiment, also funded by
the NIH.
Empirical research shows that some
experiments are extremely difficult to repli-
cate, due to the contingencies associated
with experimental work and the nature of
knowledge. First, replication of past work
using published documents is problematic
because scientific articles rarely provide a
detailed account of all stages of an exper-
iment and their associated contingencies.
The methods section of scientific papers is
usually brief and provides only an overview
of the experimental methods to show that
a concept has been implemented; it is
not intended to be a step-by-step protocol
(2). Second, scientific articles rarely delve
into the problems that researchers encoun-
tered during the experiment nor do they
explain how long it took to resolve such
problems. For example, the article describ-
ing the 2010 creation of a self-replicating
Mycoplasma mycoides cell by researchers at
the J. Craig Venter Institute (JCVI) includes
a two-sentence statement indicating that
the team faced challenges with transplanta-
tion, which were eventually overcome (3).
However, interviews with JCVI scientists
reveal that transplantation attempts rou-
tinely failed for 2 years, leading the scientist
responsible for transplantation to consider
abandoning the project. As her supervisor
explains:
After two years of just seven days a
week [of continuous work], she came
into my office saying she wanted to
work on a new project; she couldn’t do
this anymore . . .. We tried lots and lots
of different approaches. And we had
suspicions of something we thought
might work . . . but these were hard
experiments to do with a lot of reagent
prep for every experiment . . .. Every-
thing you could possibly think of that
might allow you to move a really big
piece of DNA into a cell [we tried] (4).
Publications often play down the long and
painstaking process of systematic problem
solving that is often required to resolve
difficulties involved in experimental work,
leaving the false impression that problems
can be readily overcome.
Experimental work also sometimes
requires the development of new tech-
niques and protocols that cannot easily be
used for other purposes or by other indi-
viduals. In the M.mycoides transplantation
case, a new protocol had to be designed
for the experiment, and was published
in 2007. Yet, 6 years later, the researchers
were not able to use this protocol for
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work with another organism (4). Addi-
tionally, the researchers worked with large
pieces of DNA that break easily during
pipetting, introducing an additional hur-
dle to replicating the experiment. To pre-
vent damage, the team emphasized the
importance of pipetting “gently” and using
pipette tips with wide openings through
which large pieces of DNA could pass
unobstructed (5). Although pipetting is
a common technique, not all scientists
were able to pipette the M. mycoides DNA
gently enough to keep it intact. As one
researcher explains:
Our genome transplanters are really
good at this [keeping supercoiled
DNA intact] . . . I sat in the same
hood . . . with Carole [Lartigue – the
expert] and we used the same
reagents . . . the only thing different
was each of us had our own pipettes
and plates, and I did a transplant in
parallel with her . . . she got . . . 2,000
colonies [successful transplants] and
I got 20. I thought I was doing
exactly what she was doing in pipet-
ting slowly. [But] doing these tricks is
still very much a magic hand sort of
thing (4).
This highlights a problem well known
among practicing scientists but generally
ignored in evaluations of the potential
reproducibility of dual-use experiments:
the importance of expertise acquired
through years of practice in the labo-
ratory. Much of this expertise involves
tacit skills not easily translated into words,
such as the muscle memory that allows
a researcher to know what constitutes
“gentle” pipetting, or acquired and repli-
cated by others, even when a technique
is demonstrated in person or an experi-
ment is done in cooperation with the tech-
nique’s designer (6–8). Moreover, labora-
tory disciplines and routines often con-
tribute to the development of laboratory-
specific skills that cannot be standardized
or transferred to a new location. The Uni-
versity of New York-Stony Brook virolo-
gists who synthesized poliovirus in 2002
emphasized the importance of maintain-
ing“sameness” in their laboratory routines,
materials, and technicians to ensure suc-
cessful results. Tellingly, a post-doctoral
fellow who spent 6 years in the New
York laboratory could not replicate his
work in his home laboratory in Bel-
gium (9).
Thus, the tacit, personal, and local
nature of knowledge constitutes a strong
barrier to reproducibility. Because know-
how does not easily translate into words,
its importance for experimental success
is frequently ignored in threat assess-
ments.
APPLICATION TO NEFARIOUS
OBJECTIVES
The NSABB’s initial decision to edit the
H5N1-related article before its publication
was followed by the Dutch government’s
decision to impose export-control restric-
tions on the Dutch team’s article. Dutch
authorities claimed that the research fell
under European Council Regulation EC
428/2009, which attempts to prevent the
spread of nuclear, chemical, and biologi-
cal weapons by requiring an export license
before publication (10). These moves are
based on the assumption that innova-
tions achieved in the laboratory can be
easily fashioned into a harmful agent or
a bioweapon. Yet, past bioweapons work
shows that transforming a scientific con-
cept developed in the laboratory into a
product that has a specific, applied pur-
pose, and functions reliably and effectively
can take several decades and require a vari-
ety of expertise. Specifically, the passage
from laboratory concept to specific appli-
cation faces the challenge of scaling-up
fragile microorganisms for large-scale pro-
duction and developing a delivery mech-
anism that will protect the agents from
environmental degradation when released
as a weapon. For example, within the Soviet
bioweapons program, the development of
an antibiotic-resistant strain of the bac-
terium that causes plague took 20 years
to achieve and involved teams at three
institutes. Scaling-up anthrax and small-
pox weapons took Soviet researchers about
5 years to achieve and required the involve-
ment of large teams of scientists, includ-
ing the designers of the original strains.
And within the U.S. bioweapons pro-
gram, scientists discovered that the bot-
ulinum toxin weapon they had produced
eventually lost some of its toxicity upon
aerosol release. These examples demon-
strate that laboratory successes do not nec-
essarily lead to successful application to a
specific purpose. Instead, specialized skills
honed over years of practice in produc-
tion and weaponization work are critical
to success (11).
NEW ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Seen against this background, fears that
the H5N1-related articles might support
replication by malevolent actors seem exag-
gerated. They ignore the fact that science
is a cumulative process where knowledge
is acquired and built through many years
of personal and collective experimentation.
Therefore, it is neither easily acquired nor
easily transferred, and even less so by means
of published articles. More importantly,
these fears also indicate that the NSABB’s
initial decision to edit the H5N1 article
before its publication was not rooted in
a risk/benefit analysis that considered the
determinants of success in scientific work.
Indeed, even though the Board interviewed
the lead authors and a variety of influenza
experts, it did not interview the scientists
and technicians who actually conducted
the laboratory work (12). In fact, impor-
tant details about the experiment’s diffi-
culty were revealed after the Board issued
its recommendation, and only as a result
of the controversy, not as a result of the
Board’s inquiry.
Therefore, any future review of dual-use
research should be based on a careful analy-
sis of the tacit, personal, and laboratory-
specific skills required to perform scien-
tific experiments. This implies that NSABB
reviewers conduct face-to-face interviews
with the scientists and technicians who
executed the laboratory work to identify
the hidden contingencies associated with
key stages of an experiment, including
the development of laboratory- or agent-
specific techniques or protocols that may
not transfer easily to a new location. A
laboratory visit may also reveal hidden
laboratory idiosyncrasies that contribute
to experimental success and may prevent
replication elsewhere. In order to improve
the NSABB’s ability to assess the ease of
replication by terrorists or states, its review-
ers should also include an expert who
has hands-on experience working with the
microorganism under consideration. In the
H5N1 case, NSABB members had access
to outside influenza experts, but their lack
of experience working with the influenza
virus itself, notwithstanding their expertise
in other areas, did not allow some of them
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to appreciate the importance of experi-
mental details that could have impacted
the ultimate threat assessment1. Without
a major change in the NSABB’s approach,
future restrictions might result in two
equally negative consequences. First, sus-
picions among foreign entities that restric-
tions on scientific work are hiding U.S. gov-
ernment bioweapons work might increase.
Second, scientists may avoid U.S.-funded
research for fear that the government might
block their work from being published.
To wit, the Dutch scientist who conducted
the H5N1 research temporarily blocked by
the NSABB recently published a follow-up
study in the journal Cell. In the Section
“Acknowledgment,” he stipulated that the
work was not funded by the NIH (13).
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